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THE EVOLUTION OF A FEDERAL FAMILY LAW
POLICY UNDER TITLE IV-A OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT-THE AID TO
FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT
CHILDREN PROGRAM
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program,' created
over fifty-years ago, was one of several federal programs enacted under the
original Social Security Act 2 to protect the economic security of children in
America.' Unlike the other social security programs created under the 1935
legislation, which were perceived as a form of insurance, the primary objective of AFDC was to provide federal funding to assist states in financing
mothers' aid pension programs. 4 The legislative history suggests that Congress did not envision federalizing the operation of the AFDC program.5
Few mandatory federal eligibility requirements were imposed in the early
1. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) makes cash payments to families with needy dependent children who, by definition, are deprived of parental
support. The original name Aid to Dependent Children was changed in 1962. See Public
Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a)(2), 76 Stat. 173, 185 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1982)).
2. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29
(1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-606 (1982)).
3. There were 11 broad social programs authorized under the original 1935 Act. In
addition to the AFDC program, other provisions under the Act included a wide range of
programs targeted at aged persons and blind persons, specialized services for crippled children,
and other maternal and child health and welfare services. For a detailed discussion of the
historical development of the Social Security Act, see Cohen, The Development of the Social
Security Act of 1935: Reflections Some Fifty Years Later, 68 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1983).
4. The significant difference Congress perceived between the AFDC program and the
other social security programs was expressed in the remarks of Representative Doughton:
The essential feature of the social security bill is that of social insurance against the
principle hazards or risks which have caused American families to be dependent
upon relief. These causes are well known: (1) unemployment, (2) old age, (3) lack of
a breadwinner in families with young children, and (4) sickness. . . . [Legislative
bills] proposed to furnish protection against the risks arising out of old age and unemployment are usually called social insurance. Social insurance protects the worker
and his family against dependency by enabling them . . . to build up reserves ...
during periods of unemployment and in old age. [Legislative bills to protect] the
family with young children under 16 lacking a wage earner, is provided through
Government funds rather than through social insurance.
79 CONG. REC. 5468 (1935) (statement of Rep. Doughton introducing the original social security bill).
5. See id. at 5476 (remarks of Rep. Doughton).
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decades of the program 6 and states retained major responsibility for the design and administration of the AFDC program.7
Administration of the AFDC program reflected the philosophies and values embodied in the family and domestic relations laws of the individual
states. 8 The structure of the AFDC program was also molded, however, by
its federal-state financing arrangement.9 The United States Supreme Court
first labeled this financing scheme as "cooperative federalism" in King v.
Smith. " As the federal government's role in financing the AFDC program
increased, so did its concomitant interest in imposing federal policy goals
and direction." Thus, in view of recent attempts by Congress to curtail
spiraling program costs, amendments to the AFDC statute have been enacted primarily to reduce the welfare rolls.' 2 The focus of recent amendments has been to meet the statutory objective of helping families "attain or
retain capability for their maximum self-support and personal independence"" 3 through enactment of cost-saving welfare legislation.1" Significant
numbers of single-parent families will inevitably receive welfare benefits
6. The original Social Security Act set out certain administrative requirements as a condition of receipt of funds under the Act. The original statute required each state to demonstrate an intent to administer the AFDC program in conformity with certain state plan
requirements upon approval by the administering federal agency. See Social Security Act, ch.
531, §§ 401-406.
7. From 1939 to 1961, amendments to the AFDC section of the Social Security Act
expanded state options to participation. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch.
666, § 403, 53 Stat. 1360, 1380 (option to cover children over age 16) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 606 (1982)); Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 323(b), 64 Stat.
477, 551 (option to include one needy relative along with child) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 606 (1982)); Social Security Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, §§ 312,
321, 322, 70 Stat. 807, 848-49 (option to provide social services) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-603 (1982)); Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 1, 75 Stat. 75 (option to
provide aid based on unemployment of one parent) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 607
(1982)).
8. See generally Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of the AFDC Program Since 1935,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (1974) (concluding that federally imposed requirements gradually
liberalized the AFDC program and removed some control from state and local government).
9. See, e.g., Doolittle, State-Imposed Nonfinancial Eligibility Conditions in AFDC: Confusion in Supreme Court Decisions and A Need for Congressional Clarification, 19 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1 (1982).
10. 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
11. See 108 CONG. REC. 12,660-64 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Kerr on the Public Welfare
Amendments of 1962).
12. See S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., IstSess. 2, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 397.

13. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1982) (other statutory objectives enumerated are: to encourage care
of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives, and to help maintain
and strengthen family life).
14. See supra note 12.
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under the AFDC program.' 5 These families will enter the16welfare system
via the state that administers the program where they live.
Albeit indirectly, important family law matters are decided in determining
a family's eligibility for public benefits under the AFDC program, both at
the point of entry and throughout the family's participation in the system.' 7
Federal AFDC and child support enforcement provisions,' 8 as well as state
welfare policies mirroring family and domestic relations laws of states, affect
AFDC eligibility decisions made by states.' 9 The interplay of these rules
under the scheme of cooperative federalism often produces incompatible results and serious implications for concerns such as family stability.2"
15. See OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., SSA PUB. No. 13-11731, FINDINGS OF THE MAY
1981-MAY 1982 AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN STUDY (1985). During this
period it was estimated that nearly 7.2 million children received AFDC, over 85% of them
because of the absence of one parent from the home. Id. at 4. These families were predominantly headed by women and reflected the general trend toward increased numbers of femaleheaded households in the general population. Id. See also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No. 149, MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF
FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1984, at 3 (1985).
When President Reagan proclaimed National Single Parent Day, 1984, he stated "[b]efore
they are eighteen, about half of our Nation's children will have lived part of their lives with a
single parent who strives to fill the role of both mother and father ....
" President's Statement
on Signing Proclamation No. 5166, 49 Fed. Reg. 10,919 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. &

ADMIN.

NEWS A-29.

16. See

OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., SSA PUB. No. 80-21,235, FOREWORD TO CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PLANS FOR AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1986). All

50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories-Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands participate in the AFDC program.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (1982). This provision requires that an individual (usually
a parent) assign any rights to child support to the state as a condition of receipt of AFDC. The
individual must also cooperate with the state to establish paternity and secure support of any
child born out of wedlock who is receiving AFDC. Failure to cooperate, without good cause,
results in ineligibility for the parent but not the child. Both applicants and recipients of aid
must meet this statutory requirement. Id.
18. See Social Services Amendments of 1974, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2337, 2351-58 (1975)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660 (1982)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981, §§ 2301-2306, 2311, 95 Stat. 357, 843-46, 852-53 (1981) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 602, 606, 612 (1982)); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, tit. VI, § 2640, 98 Stat. 494,
1145 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) (Supp. III 1985)).
19. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a)(1) (1985) ("The determination whether a child has
been deprived of parental support or care .. .will be made only in relation to the child's
natural or adoptive parent, or in relation to the child's stepparent ... [if the stepparent is]
legally obligated to support the child under [s]tate law ....").
20. See Roberts, In the Frying Pan and in the Fire. AFDC CustodialParentsand the IV-D
System, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1407 (1985); see also Johnson, Joint Custody Arrangements
and AFDC Eligibility, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 2 (1984); Hagen & Hoshino, Joint Custody of
Children and AFDC Eligibility, 59 SoC. SERV. REV. 636 (1985) (concluding that for poor
divorced parents joint custody may jeopardize eligibility for AFDC); see generally Folberg,
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This Comment will explore the significant historical and recent statutory
changes to the AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act that impact upon
family law policy. The impact of these statutory changes for AFDC families, the majority of whom are on the rolls because of the absence of one
parent, will then be examined. Specifically, this Comment will consider the
new issues raised by recently enacted AFDC amendments and certain federal child support enforcement provisions with respect to the definition of
"dependent" child. From a state perspective, this Comment will also examine recent trends in state-enacted joint custody statutes and their implications for family eligibility under the AFDC program. The interplay of the
federal statutory rules with the issues raised by state joint custody laws, in
light of their potential long term impact on the majority of AFDC families,
will be analyzed in an attempt to illuminate the need for congressional attention in this area. Finally, this Comment will conclude by advocating a need
for greater assessment of the impact of social welfare legislation, like the
AFDC program, on family stability before laws are enacted.
I.

SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL AND RECENT AFDC STATUTORY
CHANGES AND THEIR IMPACT ON FAMILY LAW POLICY

A.

Who May Be a Dependent Child

States have been given considerable leeway within the federal statutory
framework to tailor the structure of their AFDC programs. 2 Early in the
history of the program, state welfare regulations defining who may receive
aid as a dependent child under a state's AFDC plan were heavily influenced
by state family and domestic relation laws.22 These laws, including those
covering emancipation of minors,23 marriage, 24 and state-imposed duties of
spousal and child support obligations, served as the basis for state welfare
policies regarding deprivation of parental support.2 5 Vestiges of these laws
Joint Custody Law-The Second Wave, 23 J.

FAM.

L. 1 (1984) (discussing recent trends in

state-enacted joint custody statutes).
21. See Annotation, Who Is "Dependent Children" Within Meaning of§§ 406(a), 407(a),
and 408(a) of the Social Security Act (42 USC §§ 606(a), 607(a), and (608(a)) Entitling Families to Aidfor Dependent Children (AFDC), 23 A.L.R. FED. 232 (1975 & Supp. 1986); see, e.g.,
79 AM. JUR. 2D Welfare Laws §§ 6-24 (1975).
22. See Annotation, supra note 21.
23. See, e.g., Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Va. 1972); Daniels v. Thompson,
269 A.2d 437 (D.C. 1970) (upholding state denial of AFDC benefits to emancipated child).
24. See Annotation, supra note 21.
25. See, e.g., Darrow v. D'Elia, 54 A.D.2d 905, 388 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1976) (upholding a
decision by welfare agency terminating benefits to a stepchild in part because the stepfather
was paying gas and electric bills, and shared a joint bank account with child's mother). See
generally Note, AFDC Eligibility and the FederalStepparent Regulation, 57 TEX. L. REV. 79
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figure prominently in the current AFDC program,2 6 despite the fact that
federal laws addressing some areas would appear to preempt state law.27 In
1981, for example, Congress amended the federal AFDC statute to require
the consideration of stepparent income by states in determining eligibility
and further provided a uniform federal formula. 28 However, this formula is
not applied nationwide in the AFDC program, and Congress apparently
found this acceptable. 29 Several states deny AFDC benefits where the step30
parent resides in the home based on state stepparent duty-to-support laws.
The original AFDC statute broadly defined the children eligible under the
Social Security Act. States participating in the AFDC program could receive federal matching funds for aiding any child who is under the age of
sixteen and living with a relative, and who is deprived of parental support or
care because of death, continued absence from the home or physical or
mental incapacity of a parent. 3 ' In 1939, in an effort to clarify the purpose
(1978) (reviewing case law addressing the issues prior to the adoption of the uniform federal
formula for consideration of stepparent income).'
26. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (1985) states that a state plan under title IV-A shall provide that:
(1) The determination whether a child has been deprived of parental support ...
will be made only in relation to the child's natural or adoptive parent, or in relation
to the child's stepparent who is ceremonially married to the child's ... parent and is
legally obligated to support the child under State law of general applicability which
require stepparents to support stepchildren to the same extent that natural or adoptive parents are required to support their children.
45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a)(1) (1985).
27. See Doolittle, supra note 9, at 17-19. The author discusses Supreme Court constitutional analysis of the federal preemption doctrine in AFDC. He argues that "[t]he basic issue
in preemption cases is whether state legislation unacceptably obstructs the accomplishment of
the objectives of an act of Congress." Id. at 17. In summary, the author predicts that the
Supreme Court will rarely find the federal preemption doctrine a persuasive basis for invalidating state AFDC regulations because of potential conflict with federal legislation.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(31) (1982). Under this formula, income of a stepparent residing in
the home of an AFDC dependent child is deemed available after recognizing certain disregards
of the stepparent's income for the support of'the stepparent and other dependents.
29. 127 CONG. REC. 19,099 (1981) (statement of Sen. Dole that stepparent "proposal is
intended to set a minimum level for stepparent responsibility, not to reduce the accountability
of stepparents in those States that have an approved plan of stepparent responsibility").
30. 46 Fed. Reg. 46,750, 46,754 (1981). The Department of Health and Human Services,
Social Security Administration, identified six states with stepparent laws of general applicability-Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. In these
states a child is not deemed deprived of parental support where both a natural parent and
stepparent live in the home, unless the stepparent is incapacitated (or unemployed if the state
has elected to recognize unemployment as a condition of deprivation). In all other states
where a stepparent lives in the home, a child is considered deprived because of the absence of
one natural parent. Thus, a child living in these states will automatically pass the first prong of
the AFDC eligibility test. The second prong of the test will require consideration of the stepparent's income using the federal formula. See supra note 28.
31. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, § 406, 49 Stat. 620, 629 (1935)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1982)).
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of the program, Congress further required that a dependent child be "needy"
in order to receive aid.32 Consequently, since the 1939 amendments, eligibility of a child under the AFDC program has been determined by applying a
two-prong test. 33 First, the child must be found by the state to be "dependent." By the terms of the statute, "dependent" means that the child must
be deprived of parental support or care.34 Second, the child must pass a
"needs" test that requires an assessment of the child's financial situation.35
Income available to the child is compared to a standard expressed in monetary terms that is established by the state as the amount necessary to maintain a hypothetical family at a subsistence level.36
To determine whether a child is deprived of parental support or care because of the absence of one parent, the state must apply a federal standard
that requires both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the nature of the
parent's absence. 37 Although the language of the federal regulation regarding absence has been virtually unchanged throughout the history of the
32. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 403, 53 Stat. 1360, 1380 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1982)).
33. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(1)(i) (1985) ("The phrase 'needy child . . . deprived by
reason of' requires that both need and deprivation of parental support or care exist in the
individual case.").
34. 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1982). Section 606 states in part that "[tihe term 'dependent child'
means a needy child ... who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the
death, continued absence from the home ... ." Id.
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1982). Under the AFDC statute, states must adopt standards of
assistance by which the child's and any caretaker relative's needs are measured. The standards
are commonly referred to as the need and payment standards. See generally 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.20 (1985).
36. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (1985). Eligibility and payment amounts for AFDC
are determined by measuring income of the specified number of children and caretakers (referred to as an assistance unit) against these standards. If the income of the assistance unit is
less than the standards of assistance adopted by the state, the assistance unit is eligible for
payment under the state's AFDC program. This is an oversimplification of the eligibility and
payment determination process. It is solely intended to illustrate that eligibility under the
AFDC program is established using a two-part process.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged the broad discretion of
states in determining the standard of need and the level of benefits. For a summary of various
Court decisions recognizing the AFDC eligibility test, see Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184,
189 n.3 (1985).
37. The standard discussed at 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 states that:
Continued absence of the parent from the home constitutes the reason for deprivation of parental support or care when the parent is out of the home, the nature of the
absence is such as either to interrupt or to terminate the parent's functioning as a
provider of maintenance, physical care, or guidance for the child, and the known or
indefinite duration of the absence precludes counting on the parent's performance of
the function of planning for the present support or care of the child.
45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(1)(iii) (1985).
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AFDC program, 38 its interpretation has undergone a metamorphosis to ac-

commodate the general changing patterns of family life.39 For example, the
early version of the regulation clearly contemplated that the typical family
situation would involve a parent, usually the father, who deserts the family
and whose location is unknown, and consequently, neither provides support
for the child nor acts as a parent figure.4" The reality of the families who
participate in AFDC program today does not fit this scenario, 4' nor does
this scenario typically depict the general plight of single parent families.42
Nearly fifty percent of the children receiving AFDC benefits due to absence
of a parent live in homes headed by a mother who was never married to the
child's father.43 Only about nineteen percent of AFDC children have been
38. Federal AFDC regulations were incorporated in the HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION prior to official transfer to the Code of Federal Regulations. See 36
Fed. Reg. 3860 (1971). An early version of the provision of the HANDBOOK, dated Nov. 4,
1946, interpreted continued absence as follows:
3422.2 Interpretation-Continuedabsence of the parent from the home constitutes
the reason for deprivation of parental support or care under the following
circumstances:
1. When the parent is out of the home;
2. When the nature of the absence is such as either to interrupt or to terminate the
parent's functioning as a provider of maintenance, physical care, or guidance for the
child; and
3. When the known or indefinite duration of the absence precludes counting on the
parent's performance of his function in planning for the present support or care of
the child,
A child comes within this interpretation if for any reasons his parent is absent, and
this absence interferes with the child's receiving maintenance, physical care, or guidance from his parent, and precludes the parent's being counted on for support or
care of the child. For example: The child's father has left home, without forewarning his family, and the mother really does not know why he left home, nor when or
whether he will return. Within this interpretation of continued absence the State
agency in developing its policy will find it necessary to give consideration to such
situations as divorce, pending divorce, desertion, informal or legal separation, hospitalization for medical or psychiatric care, search for employment, employment away
from home, service in the armed forces or other military service, and imprisonment.
BUREAU OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY,

HANDBOOK FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, pt. IV, § 3422.2 (1946).
39. See generally Johnson, supra note 20; see also Hagen & Hoshino, supra note 20 (noting
the growing trend toward awarding custody to both parents rather than one).
40. See supra note 38.
41. See, e.g., Simone v. State, 191 N.J. Super. 228, 465 A.2d 1226 (1983) (father of AFDC
children resided in same apartment building).
42. See, e.g., Burrus v. Department of Human Servs. Div. of Pub. Welfare, 194 N.J.
Super. 60, 476 A.2d 285 (1984) (single AFDC mother and child resided with her mother so she
could attend school, and father of child, who was also a student, visited at least three times a
week).
43. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEAlTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SSA PUB. No. 13-11731, FINDINGS OF THE MAY 1981-MAY 1982 AID TO
FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN STUDY (1985).
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classified as eligible because of desertion of one parent.'
Moreover, the absent parent in today's AFDC program is likely to be
making some child support payments on behalf of the child4" and is encouraged to establish contact with the family.46 Consequently, the current
interpretation of what constitutes continued absence has little resemblance
to the rule adopted in the early AFDC program.4 7 Under the early rule, if
an absent parent voluntarily provided child support payments or visited the
children on a regular basis, the family usually lost its AFDC eligibility.48 In
the above situation, the child would be deemed not deprived of parental support or care because the absent parent provided maintenance or guidance to
the child.4 9
State welfare agencies and courts alike have reached differing conclusions
on what constitutes "absence" for purposes of AFDC eligibility.5" However,
the one consistent conclusion reached by the majority of courts regarding
absence is that where state welfare agencies apply impermissible presumptive
standards to decide the question, the courts will not as a matter of law recognize them.5 ' The determination of absence principally involves resolving the
factual questions of whether a parent's absence is such that it "interrupts or
terminates the parent's functioning as a provider of maintenance, physical
care or guidance of the child, and the known or indefinite duration of the
44. Id.
45. White Horse v. Heckler, 627 F. Supp. 848 (D.S.D. 1985) (permanently enjoined welfare agency from counting court-ordered child support payments for the benefit of specific
child as income to assistance unit). See, e.g., Gorrie v. Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 368 (D. Minn.)
(preliminary injunction granted because family receiving child support payments risks irreparable harm to their family structure through enforcement of the filing unit definition F.U.D.
rule), permanent injunction granted, 624 F. Supp. 85 (D. Minn. 1985).
46. See supra note 39.
47. See supra note 38.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Shannon v. Department of Human Servs., 157 N.J. Super. 251, 384 A.2d 899
(1978) (upholding merits of agency decision to terminate AFDC benefits because of mother's
admission that father frequently visited child; but reversed on other grounds); Pellman v.
Heim, 87 N.M. 410, 534 P.2d 1122 (1975) (reversing agency decision terminating AFDC benefits where divorced father maintained regular pattern of visitation).
51. See, e.g., Hughes v. Adult & Family Servs. Div., 58 Or. App. 478, 648 P.2d 1324
(1982). In this case, which involved a husband and wife who were separated, the Oregon
Court of Appeals recognized the state welfare agency's regulation presuming absence, for purposes of AFDC, in situations where there was evidence of a parent's incarceration, or a pending divorce, legal separation, or paternity action. However, the court denied "absence" status
of the father because he was not continually out of the home. Id. at 1327. But see Freeman v.
Lukhard, 465 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1979) (upholding agency regulation that presumed
absence of a parent without regard to maintenance, physical care or guidance if absence is
caused by divorce, desertion, incarceration, deportation, or inability to establish paternity).
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absence precludes the parent's performance of his/her function in planning
for the present support or care of the child." 52
In Simone v. State,53 the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, found that the plaintiff lived in the same five-family apartment building
as her spouse's parents. The plaintiff's spouse, the father of two of her children, left the premises following their separation, but subsequently returned
to live with his parents. He never visited the children or contributed financially to their support. The state argued that it was ipso facto lack of deprivation due to absence if both parents lived at the same address. The court
rejected the state's argument, concluding that such evidence showed merely
an opportunity of the absent parent to exercise parental responsibility by his
proximity to the family, but that such an opportunity did not automatically
defeat AFDC eligibility. 54 The court held that it was improper for the state
to conclude that a spouse's residence in the same building, although in a
different apartment, negated any interruption or termination of the parent's
functioning as a provider.55 Accordingly, the court reversed the state administrator's decision to reduce the plaintiff's AFDC benefits.5 6
The Simone decision is in harmony with another decision on the issue of
absence for AFDC purposes.5 7 In Burrus v. Department of Human Services, 58 the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that a
pattern of frequent visitations by a nonresident parent, although relevant in
the determination of eligibility, is not a sole reason for termination.5 9 The
plaintiff in Burrus, a single parent, resided with her mother, who assisted in
the care of the child while the plaintiff attended school. The child's father
visited the child at least three times a week. When the plaintiff indicated to
the welfare department that she was contemplating living with the father of
the child and inquired as to how this living arrangement would affect her
AFDC grant, the welfare agency terminated benefits on the grounds that
"there was no absence nor deprivation of parental support or care within the
meaning of AFDC requirements."'
The Burrus court reasoned that
although visits are relevant, they are not dispositive in the determination of
52. See Simone v. State, 191 N.J. Super. 228, 229, 465 A.2d 1226, 1229 (1983); see also
Burris v. Department of Human Servs. Div. of Public Welfare, 194 N.J. Super. 60, 60, 476
A.2d 285, 287 (1984).
53. Simone, 191 N.J. Super. at 228, 465 A.2d at 1226.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 233, 465 A.2d at 1227-29.
Id. at 235, 465 A.2d at 1230.
Id. at 235, 465 A.2d at 1230.
See, e.g., Burrus, 194 N.J. Super. at 60, 476 A.2d at 285.
See id. at 60, 476 A.2d at 285.
Id. at 68, 476 A.2d at 288.
Id. at 61, 476 A.2d at 286.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 36:197

absence. 61 The court noted that the agency must also consider whether the
absent parent continues to contribute to the basic maintenance and care of
the child. 62 The court stated that "[w]hile [the father] may visit the child a
few times each week and may exhibit pride and love toward the infant, that
'continuing relationship' does not constitute performance of parental functions.", 63 The Burrus court, therefore, concluded that the father did not provide the requisite maintenance and guidance. 64
The Simone and the Burrus cases illustrate one view of the proper approach to the factual determination of whether, for AFDC purposes, a child
is deprived because of an absent parent. In both cases, the decisions turned
on the visits by the nonresident parent in determining the existence of a
continuing relationship with the AFDC family.6 5
An opposing view is expressed in Hughs v. Adult & Family Services Division.66 In this case, the Court of Appeals of Oregon upheld the state welfare
agency's decision to terminate AFDC benefits because the father visited the
child regularly, was found to have stored personal items at the mother's
home, and occasionally cared for the children. The welfare agency terminated aid, finding that there was no "valid separation" since the spouse was
not continually absent for thirty days. 67 The court concluded that the state
correctly applied a two-prong test under the Oregon regulation in determining deprivation due to absence.68 The first prong of the test required that the
parent be out of the home for thirty days.69 Since the evidence established
that the father was not continually out of the home for thirty days, the court
concluded that the state was not required to reach the second prong of the
test, namely, that absence precluded the father's functioning as a provider of
70
maintenance, physical care, or guidance.
It is now well settled in the AFDC program that the mere receipt of child
support on a regular basis from a noncustodial parent is an insufficient
ground to consider the child not deprived of parental support because the
absent parent provides maintenance. 7' As a result of the federalization of
61.

Id. at 66, 476 A.2d at 288.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id., 476 A.2d at 288.
Id. at 68, 476 A.2d at 288.
Id. at 68, 476 A.2d at 289.
See Simone, 191 N.J. Super. at 233, 465 A.2d at 1229-30; see also Burrus, 194 N.J.

Super. at 68, 476 A.2d at 285.
66. Hughes v. Adult & Family Serv. Div., 58 Or. App. 478, 648 P.2d 1324 (1982).
67. Id. at 480, 648 P.2d at 1327.

68. Id. at 479, 648 P.2d at 1326.
69. Id., 648 P.2d at 1326.
70. Id., 648 P.2d at 1326.
71.

See, e.g., Gorrie v. Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 368 (D. Minn. 1985). But see Freeman v.
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child support enforcement,72 an AFDC payment is not terminated by a collection of child support from the noncustodial parent unless the payment
exceeds the income standards set by the state.73
B.

AFDC and the Child Support Enforcement Program

The original federal child support enforcement program was created in
response to two main concerns in the AFDC program: (1) the increasing
welfare rolls, by the early 1970's, as a result of absent fathers failing to pay
child support, and (2) the increasing congressional dissatisfaction with state
initiatives to enforce child support obligations.7 4 Congress believed that the
national welfare problem was exacerbated by the nonsupport of children. It
was also concerned with increasing federal expenditures in the AFDC program. As a result, Congress launched the federal government into an area
traditionally regarded as a state concern. 75 The primary purposes of the
federal child support enforcement program are to obtain support from the
absent parent, to use such collections to reimburse the state for AFDC payments, and to pay any excess amounts to AFDC families.76
Companion amendments to the AFDC program were enacted at the same
time as the child support enforcement provisions.7 7 States were required to
operate a state child support enforcement program as a condition of federal
AFDC funding. 78 Under the statute, individuals seeking AFDC assistance
are required to cooperate with the state through the child support enforcement program to establish paternity and obtain support from the absent
Lukhard, 465 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1979) (child eligible only if absent parent provides no
maintenance).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 651 (1982).
73. 45 C.F.R. § 232.20 (1985) (treatment of child support collections made in the Child
Support Enforcement program as income and resources in the AFDC program).
74. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2337,
2351-58 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660 (1982)). See S. REP. No. 1356,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 8133, 8147.
75. S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 8133. See 11 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 20 (Jan. 13, 1975) (President's

statement upon signing Social Service Amendments of 1974). Then President Ford expressed
some reservations as he signed the child support enforcement bill into law. He stated that
while he agreed with the objectives of collecting child support payments, he believed certain
provisions went too far by injecting the federal government into domestic relations. I I
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 20 (Jan. 13, 1975).
76. S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 8153.
77. Social Services Amendments of 1974, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2348, 2349, 2359-60 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)-(28) (1982)).
78. S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 8133, 8151.
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parent. 7
Recently, Congress has reaffirmed its commitment to an active federal role
in child support enforcement, but now as a federal-state partnership.8" Because many viewed the federal child support enforcement program as successful, but believed there was a need to increase state administrative
efficiency and to strengthen collection activity,"' Congress passed the Child
Support Enforcement Amendment of 1984 to improve enforcement of child
support obligations.8 2
One of the key concerns raised during the congressional debates of the
1984 bill was the issue of visitation rights by noncustodial parents. 83 Congressional action would appear to support and encourage contact with the
family by the noncustodial parent in general; however, there is evidence that
Congress had little notion of the implications of the nexus between enforcement of visitation rights and AFDC eligibility.8 4 Too much visitation by the
79. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (1982) provides that:
[a]s a condition of eligibility ... each application or recipient will be required(A) to assign the State any rights to support from any other person such applicant
may have.., in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom
the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, and...
(B) to cooperate with the State (i) in establishing ... paternity of a child ... (ii)...
in obtaining any other payments or property due such applicant or ... child ....
Id.
80. S. REP. No. 387, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2397.

81. 130 CONG. REC. S4807 (daily ed. April 25, 1984) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
82. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat.
1305 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 651 (Supp. III 1985)). During the 1984 congressional debates of
the statutory amendments, reported data showed that about $8.8 billion in child support payments had been collected as a result of the federal child support enforcement program. Of this
amount $3.8 billion was collected on behalf of AFDC families and as a result nearly 32,000
cases had been removed from the AFDC rolls. However, it was also estimated that overdue
payments for AFDC-related child support totaled $9 billion and were increasing at a rate of
$1.5 billion each year. See 130 CONG. REC. S4807 (daily ed. April 25, 1984) (remarks of Sen.
Domenici).
83. 130 CONG. REC. S4808 (daily ed. April 25, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Dole and Sen.
Jespen). Congress expressed significant concern that the child support provisions not interfere
with state enforcement of visitation rights. By concurrent resolution it went on record as
recognizing that both financial support and visitation are essential aspects of parental involvement. Id. at S4806. See S. CON. RES. 84, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), 130 CONG. REC. S4806
(daily ed. April 25, 1984) (sense of Congress that state and local governments should focus on
the problems of child custody, child support, and related domestic issues).
84. In a colloquy between Sen. Jespen and Sen. Dole regarding the impact of the child
support enforcement legislation in states with joint custody statutes, Sen. Dole stated:
[T]here is nothing in the Finance Committee amendments which would prevent
States from moving in the direction of joint custody or shared parental duties. The
Finance Committee believes that these are areas of domestic law which are properly
in the jurisdiction of the States. Nothing in the bill or in the committee amendments
should be construed as altering that fact.... [A] number of studies ... indicate that
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noncustodial parent of an AFDC child has rendered the child ineligible because the child was not considered deprived of parental support or care."5 It
remains to be seen, in light of the diversity of state welfare policies and decisions by courts regarding the definition of "dependent child" in the AFDC
program, whether, in the context of the welfare system, there is adequate
flexibility to recognize and promote policies like joint custody or shared
require meaningful involvement of the absent parent with
parenting which
86
family.
the
II.

MODERN TRENDS IN JOINT CUSTODY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
FAMILY ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE

AFDC

PROGRAM

Several commentators have discussed extensively the problem that joint
custody arrangements pose for AFDC families.8 7 When an application is
made on behalf of a child, the state welfare agency must establish that the
child is deprived of parental support. If the reason for deprivation is continued absence of a parent, and there has been court ordered joint custody or an
informal joint custody arrangement, then the custodial AFDC parent (usually the mother) has the burden of proving that the parent's contact, if any,
is insignificant.8 8
The dilemma for the AFDC family becomes obvious when viewed from
the different perspectives of the goals of the federal and state governments.8 9
It is clear that because of the potential for denial of AFDC benefits, the
joint custody arrangements lead to more involvement for both parents. Also demonstrated is the fact that child support obligations are met on a regular basis in most
cases of joint custody or shared parental responsibility.
130 CONG. REC. S4804 (daily ed. April 25, 1984) (statement of Sen. Dole).
85. See Freeman v. Lukhard, 456 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1979). In this case, the federal
district court upheld termination of AFDC benefits on behalf of two children whose father
visited the children daily, discussed their care with the mother, and provided milk and diapers
for the children.
86. See, e.g., Pellman v. Heim, 87 N.M. 410, 534 P.2d 1122 (1975) (reversing agency
decision terminating AFDC benefits where divorced father maintained regular pattern of visitation); Shannon v. Department of Human Servs., 157 N.J. Super. 251, 384 A.2d 899 (1978)
(upholding merits of agency decision to terminate AFDC benefits because of mother's admission that father frequently visited child; but reversed on other grounds). See generally Johnson, supra note 20; Hagen & Hoshino, supra note 20 (noting the growing trend toward
awarding custody to both parents rather than one).
87. See generally Johnson, supra note 20, at 2; Hagen & Hoshino, supra note 20, at 636.
88. See supra note 87; see also 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (1985).
89. See. e.g., Cook, California'sJoint Custody Statute in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED
PARENTING 168-83 (J. Folberg ed. 1984) (author suggests that state was motivated to enact
joint custody statute to deter divorcing parents who would be prone to pursue sole custody out
of vindictiveness, leverage, or extortion). Congress acknowledged that joint custody arrangements encouraged regular patterns of payment of child support obligations. 130 CON. REC.
S4804 (daily ed. April 25, 1984) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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AFDC family must discourage meaningful contact with the noncustodial

parent,90 even though state governmental policies promote and enforce such
contact. 9 1 Moreover, Congress has expressed the view that enforcement of
both visitation rights and the pursuit and collection
of child support pay92
ments should be of equal priority to the states.
There is no overwhelming consensus among family law professionals that
joint custody following divorce is in the best interest of all children. 93 Nev94
ertheless, the trend has been for states to enact joint custody statutes.
There are currently at least thirty-one states with some form of a joint custody statute. 95 The courts have also figured significantly in the emergence of
joint custody as the preferable arrangement over the traditional approach of
sole custody. 96

There are essentially three different legislative approaches to state joint
90. See Johnson, supra note 20; Hagen & Hoshino, supra note 20.
91. See, e.g., Folberg, Issues and Trends in the Law ofJoint Custody in JOINT CUSTODY
AND SHARED PARENTING 159-67 (J. Folberg ed. 1984).
92. See 130 CONG. REC. S4807 (daily ed. April 25, 1984) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
93. See, e.g., Elkin, Joint Custody: In the Best Interest of the Family in JOINT CUSTODY
AND SHARED PARENTING 11-15 (J. Folberg ed. 1984). The author states that "[t]he distinguishing feature of joint legal custody is that both parents retain legal responsibility and authority for the care and control of the child, much as in an intact family. Joint custody
basically means providing each parent with an equal voice in the children's education, upbringing, religious training, nonemergency medical care, and general welfare." Id. at 6. Joint physical custody (as distinguished from joint legal custody) refers to the sharing of residential care
of the child usually on a regular basis. See id. at 7. Many other definitions are found in the
literature. See generally JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING (J. Folberg ed. 1984).
94. See generally JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING (J. Folberg ed. 1984).
95. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.20.060, 25.20.090, 25.20.100 (1983); CAL. CIv. CODE
§§ 4600, 4600.5 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-10-108, 14-10-123.5, 14-10-124, 14-10131.5 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-56, 46b-66 (West Supp. 1986); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 701 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b) (West 1985); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 571-46, 571-46.1 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (1983); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, § 602.1 (Smith-Hurd 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21 (Burns Supp.
1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.1, 598.21, 598.41 (West Supp. 1986); 1985 KAN. SESS. LAWS,
ch. 115, § 48 (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(4)(A) (1985)); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 405.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 146 (West Supp.
1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214 (Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208,
§ 31 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.003, 518.17 (West Supp. 1986); MIss.
CODiE ANN. § 93-5-24 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (Vernon 1986): MONr. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-4-223, 40-4-224 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.480. 125.490 (Michie
1986); N.H. Ri-v. STAT. ANN. § 458.17 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(b) (1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.04, 3109.041 (Anderson
1985); OKI.A. STA[r. ANN. tit. 10, § 21.1 (West Supp. 1985); OR, REv. STAT. §§ 107.095,
107.105 (1985); PA. STA'. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 5301, 5304 (Purdon 1986); TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN.
§ 14.06(a) (Vernon 1986); WIsc. SirAT. ANN. § 767.24(l)(b) (West 1981).
96. See, e.g.. Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981); Lumbra v. Lumbra, 136 Vt.
529, 394 A.2d 1139 (1978).
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custody statutes.9 7 One commentator classified the legislative models as: (1)
the option approach, (2) the preference approach, and (3) the presumptive
approach.9 8 Under the option approach, a joint custody statute provides the
court with the discretion to consider joint custody as one of several alternatives.9 9 The preference model varies from the option approach in that the
statute requires the court to give a preference for joint custody over sole
custody."° Under the presumptive approach, the state statute establishes a
presumption that joint custody is always in the best interest of the child. '
The presumptive approach is typified by the California joint custody statute.'0 2 One provision of the statute specifically addressed the issue of joint
custody as it relates to eligibility for AFDC benefits. 103 The statute provides
that in joint custody situations "the court may specify one parent as the
primary caretaker and one home as the primary home for the purposes of
determining eligibility for public assistance. '"" ' The California joint cus97. See Schulman & Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: Analysis of Legisla-

tion and Its Implicationsfor Women and Children in
ING

JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENT-

209 (. Folberg ed. 1984). See generally Hollins, Comparison of Three Joint Custody and

Shared ParentingStatutes in

JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING

184 (J. Folberg ed.

1984).
98. See Schulman & Pitt, supra note 97, at 211.
99. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.20.060, 25.20.090, 25.20.100 (1983); see also Sherry v.
Sherry, 622 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1981) (the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a custody agreement (based on the state's joint custody statute) that automatically shifted custody in certain
situations from one parent to another should have been conditioned upon prior court
approval).
100. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-223 to 40-4-224 (1984); see, e.g., Cameron v. Cameron, 197 Mont. 226, 641 P.2d 1057 (1982) (Montana Supreme Court vacated trial court's
award of sole custody to father following failure by parents to agree to a plan of care under a
joint custody order).
101. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.17 (1983); see also Stanley D. v. Deborah D., 124
N.H. 138, 467 A.2d 249 (1983) (New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed trial court's award
of joint custody to both parents where each had requested sole custody).
102. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4600.5(a) (West Supp. 1986) states that "[t]here shall be a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor
child . ..for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor child or children of the
marriage." Id. See Lemon, Joint Custody as a Statutory Presumption: California'sNew Civil
Code Sections 4600 and 4600.5, 11 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 485 (1981) (the 1984 amendments
to the California joint custody statute were an effort to provide greater specificity in joint
custody orders and to provide more direction to judges in decisionmaking). See generally Zimmerman, The Problems of Shared Custody, 4 CAL. LAW. 25 (1984).
103. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4600.5(h) (West Supp. 1986). See also 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)
(1)(v) (1985) ("Living with [a specified relative] in a place of residence maintained .. .as his
... own home.").
104. Section 4600.5(h) states: "Inmaking an order of joint physical custody or joint legal
custody, the court may specify one parent as the primary caretaker of the child and one home
as the primary home of the child, for the purposes of determining eligibility for public assistance." CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4600.5(h) (West Supp. 1986).
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tody statute represents one state's efforts to address the modern concerns of
state domestic relations laws and their impact on families receiving AFDC
benefits.
It is noteworthy that a bill was introduced in Congress to require state
courts to consider the approach of joint custody preference over sole custody.'O The bill proposed to require joint custody preference as a condition
of federal funding of states' AFDC programs. 10 6 In view of the myriad of
related AFDC issues that have not been resolved, it is urged that any such
similar measures should be carefully weighed in light of the family law goals
intended to be achieved.
The related problem of joint custody arrangements for AFDC recipients
may have a correlation to the variations in joint custody statutes. °7 This
issue is one that should be closely examined.' 8 There is no evidence, despite
the proliferation of written materials on the subject, that adequate consideration has been given to the potential impact joint custody laws may have on
AFDC families, particularly when faced with court custody proceedings initiated in the context of the federal child support enforcement program. 109
A.

The Interplay of AFDC and Child Support Enforcement Programs: A
Hindrance to Family Stability?

As previously noted, the AFDC program Congress envisioned over a halfcentury ago faces a vastly different cultural reality today. While Congress
continues to pay lip service to the notion of the state's exclusive jurisdiction
on matters of domestic relations, the AFDC program has evolved into a
federal program impacting important family law matters.
As evinced by the myriad of provisions that Congress has considered in an
effort to revamp and improve the AFDC program, there is no simple or
single approach to the problems of the AFDC program. It is crucial that
Congress take a more active approach in assessing the impact of social legislation, such as the AFDC program, on family stability.
The filing unit definition (F.U.D.) rule" o is just one example of legislation
in part enacted to achieve federal savings. Its purpose was to close a per105. H.R. 4266, 98th Cong., ist Sess. (1983).
106. Id.
107. See generally Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet To Learn,

and the Judicial and Legislative Implications in

JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING

111 (J. Folberg ed. 1984).
108. See Clingempell & Reppuccia, Joint Custody After Divorce: Major Issues and Goals for

Research in

JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING

87 (J. Folberg ed. 1984).

109. See, e.g., infra note 137.
110. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, tit. VI, § 2640, 98 Stat. 1145 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(38) (Supp. 111 1985)).
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ceived loophole in the program. The impact upon other important aspects
of the program involving family life, however, was not taken into consideration. There is no indication that Congress gave any consideration to the
impact of the F.U.D. rule and whether it was in harmony with the goals of
the child support enforcement program."'
One of the goals of the original child support enforcement program was to
collect sufficient child support to remove the family from the rolls."12 The
F.U.D. provision of 1984, in an effort to reach income received by the household that was previously not counted, forces individuals onto the AFDC
rolls." 3 The interplay of the AFDC and federal child support enforcement
programs create conflicting goals toward ensuring family stability."'
Moreover, because of the F.U.D. rule, for the first time in the history of
the AFDC program it can be advantageous for some AFDC custodial parents to claim, whether or not credibly, frequent contact by the noncustodial
parent. If the AFDC custodial parent proves that, as a result of visits by the
nonresident parent, the child is not deprived, then the child is not required
to be included in the filing unit.11 5 Consequently, the child, by definition,
would not fall within the statute, and his/her income would not be
counted." 6 As a result, the AFDC family unit is placed back into the position it would have been prior to the F.U.D. rule. This is a curious effect that
Congress probably did not contemplate when it sought to close a loophole
through enactment of the filing unit definition rule.
111. See S. REP. No. 300, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1983). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No.
861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1407, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2095.
112. See S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 8133, 8148.
113. See S. REP. No. 300, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1983).
114. Id. at 165. While a discussion of the merits of the filing unit definition rule as public
welfare policy is not within the scope of this Comment, there are other important questions
with respect to its impact on family law goals which are considered. See generally Gorrie v.
Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 368, 373 (D. Minn. 1985) (suggesting that government's financial interest in reducing welfare costs must be weighed in relation to other controlling factors). The
Gorrie court imposed an injunction against the government because "plaintiffs risked irreparable harm to their family structure." Id.
115. Frequent visits, as substantiated by case law, can produce a showing that the absent
parent provides support, maintenance or guidance to the child. See, e.g.. Pellman v. Heim, 87
N.M. 410, 534 P.2d 1122 (1975) (reversing agency decision terminating AFDC benefits where
divorced father maintained regular pattern of visitation); Shannon v. Department of Human
Servs., 157 N.J. Super. 251, 384 A.2d 899 (1978) (upholding merits of agency decision to
terminate AFDC benefits because of mother's admission that father frequently visited child;
but reversed on other grounds).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1982). Section 606 states in part that -[t]he term 'dependent child'
means a needy child ... who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the
death, continued absence from the home ...."
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The Filing Unit Definition Rule: Creatinga
New AFDC Dependent Child?

The F.U.D. rule is one of several AFDC statutory amendments enacted in
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA)" 7 that Congress labeled as
program improvements." The F.U.D. rule requires states to include, in an
application for AFDC benefits, the parents of the dependent child and all
minor dependent siblings living with the dependent child." 9 Under prior
law, the parent could elect to exclude some members of the family to avoid
counting their income. 120 These were usually minor children who received
child support or social security benefits.' 2 1 Where the child's income would
reduce the family's benefit by an amount greater than the amount payable in
benefits it was generally more financially advantageous to the family to exclude the child and thereby exclude consideration of his income in determin22
ing the AFDC benefit amount.
The DEFRA statute specifically provides for an exclusion of the first fifty
dollars of child support received.123 Absent any commentary in the legislative history, however, it is unclear whether this exclusion was intended to
deal with other extenuating circumstances associated with the receipt of
child support which were not envisioned with respect to social security benefits. 124 There is no comparable exclusion for social security benefits
although both types of payments were discussed in relation to the problem of
117. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, tit. VI, § 2640, 98 Stat. 1145
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) (Supp. III 1985)).
118. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 1407, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2069.

119. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, tit. VI, § 2640, 98 Stat. 1145
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) (Supp. III 1985)). The statute in part provides that:
[A] State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must ... provide
that in making the determination ... with respect to a dependent child ... the State
agency shall (except as otherwise provided ... ) include(A) any parent of such child, and
(B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister meets the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a) of this title, if such parent,
brother, or sister is living in the same home as the dependent child, and any income
of or available for such parent, brother, or sister shall be included in making such
determination ....

Id.
120. See S. REP. No. 300, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1983).

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, tit. VI, § 2640, 98 Stat. 1145
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1) (Supp. I11 1985)).

124. See S. REP. No. 300, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1983).

1986]

The AFDC Program

family maximization of income.' 2 5 Determination of the proper treatment
of both child support payments and social security benefits received by coresident siblings of AFDC children has been the subject of litigation and
12 6
raises important questions regarding family law goals.
Family law commentators have consistently urged governmental policies
that enhance the health and welfare of children and the family.' 27 The
Supreme Court in King v. Smith 128 declared that the "paramount goal" of
the AFDC program is to maintain and strengthen family life. 129 Other
courts have articulated that the goal of the AFDC program is to promote
family solidarity 130 and to preserve the family unit.'
Yet it has been suggested that "[d]espite a generalized cultural piety about family life, American government has been notable for a lack of social policies in support of
the family as an institution."' 13 2 The interplay of the F.U.D. rule in AFDC
and the child support enforcement program brings this problem into focus.
In Sherrod v. Hegstrom,"' a class action suit before the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon, plaintiffs alleged that the F.U.D.
rule discouraged family stability and promoted the break-up and disintegration of the family. One AFDC plaintiff claimed she had excluded her two
oldest children from the welfare rolls because they were supported by the
father. When the father learned that the children were on welfare he took
steps to obtain legal custody of the children and eventually had his court
125. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1407 (1984), 130 CONG. REC.
H6752 (daily ed. June 22, 1984).
126. See, e.g., Gorrie v. Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 368 (D. Minn.) (preliminary injunction
granted because risk of irreparable harm to the structure of family receiving child support
payments through enforcement of F.U.D. rule), permanentinjunction granted, 624 F. Supp. 85
(1985); White Horse v. Heckler, 627 F. Supp. 848 (D.S.D. 1985) (permanently enjoined welfare agency from counting court-ordered child support payments for the benefit of specific
child as income to assistance unit).
127. See generally American Families: Trends and Pressures,1983: Hearingson Examination of the Influence that Governmental Policies Have on American Families Before the Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973).
128. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
129. King, 392 U.S. at 325.
130. See Joyner v. Dumpson, 533 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (principal purpose of
Social Security Act is to "maintain and strengthen family life"), rev'd on other grounds, 712
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983).
131. Cf Gorrie v. Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 368, 372 (D. Minn.), modified, 624 F. Supp. 85
(1985).
132. Moynihan, Income By Right, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 13, 1973, at 261. See generally
D. MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NATION (1986).
133. Sherrod v. Hegstrom, 629 F. Supp. 150 (D. Or. 1985) (upholding the F.U.D. statute
as valid and not in violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights), appeal docketed, No. CA 863632 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 1986).
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ordered support obligation rescinded.1
Child custody law is not so principled as to assure that, in a custody action, the stigma of welfare will not be considered in the choice between parents. In Mandelstam v. Mandelstam, 135 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
held that if a natural parent is not capable of providing the minimum acceptable standards of care for the child, he will be deemed "unfit, unsuitable or
unqualified," and his custody will not be considered to be in the best "interests" of the child. 1 36 AFDC custodial parents are especially vulnerable to
child custody challenges because of the initiation of court proceedings in the
13
context of the child support enforcement program. 1

Gilliard v. Kirk, 13' a class action filed in the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, challenged the validity of the
application of the F.U.D. rule to co-resident siblings who were previously
independently supported because of child support payments received from
their absent parents. The plaintiffs in Gilliard were children who qualified
for AFDC benefits by the traditional showing of deprivation and need.
Their siblings, as a consequence of receiving child support payments from
their noncustodial parents, did not receive AFDC benefits.' 39 With the enactment of the F.U.D. rule, the state required the inclusion of the independently supported siblings of the AFDC children in determining AFDC
eligibility on the basis that they too were needy, dependent children."
134. Brief for plaintiff at 10-11, Sherrod v. Hegstrom, 629 F. Supp. 150 (D. Or. 1985),
appeal docketed, No. CA 86-3632 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 1986).
135. 458 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
136. Id. In Mandelstam, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky refused to award custody of a
six-year-old child to the divorced father after the mother suffered a severe mental condition.
The father, a doctor of internal medicine, was determined incapable of providing the child with
the minimum acceptable standard of care because his plan for custody of the child was to hire
a maid to take care of the child during work hours. Although the facts are not welfare related,
the holding suggests that one cannot predict what factors a court will consider in a finding of
unfitness.
137. See, e.g., Roberts, An AFDC Mother'sRight to Counsel: Custody Issues in Proceedings
Instigated by the IV-D Agency, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 278 (1985).
138. 633 F. Supp. 1529 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (held AFDC statute invalid because it infringed
on rights to familial association guaranteed under the United States Constitution), rev'd sub
nom. Gilliard v. Bowen, appeal docketed, No. 86-564 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1986). The Gilliard court
found that as a result of the F.U.D. statute, Congress expressly "pre-empted state child support laws in so far as those laws restrain the use and distribution of child support income ......
Id. at 1551. The court noted that the "pre-emption of state law represents an unconstitutional
taking that deprives the children of their entitlement to child support simply because they live
with a needy mother and half-siblings." Id. at 1553. The court concluded that the assignment
of child support money to the state represented a deprivation of property in violation of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Gilliard, 633 F. Supp. at 1564 (the state complied with the federal statutory re-
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Thus, following the F.U.D. statute, the income of the independently supported children was considered available to the family in the determination
of AFDC eligibility.' 4 ' The district court invalidated the federal statute,
concluding that the effect of the F.U.D. rule was an unlawful taking of the
child's income from the absent parent.' 4 2 The court further declared that
"the federal scheme has .. over powered state family law, and has under143
mined traditional understandings of family values and duties.
The claims repeatedly made in these cases are that the AFDC-F.U.D. rule
operates as a powerful disincentive upon the noncustodial parent to pay
child support, thereby weakening family ties."' In the context of a growing
state movement to encourage involvement with the family by the noncustodial parent, the question remains whether this is an achievable goal for the
145
AFDC family.
III.

CONCLUSION

The determination of deprivation in AFDC due to lack of parental support is a factual determination that reflects state welfare agency policies and
state laws. Accordingly, the recent state trend in favor of joint custody
could potentially impact state interpretation of the meaning of continued
absence. At the very least, joint custody situations may adversely impact the
AFDC eligibility determination because of the potential difficulty in deciding whether continued absence exists in such custody arrangements. The
above analysis suggests that the federal and state statutes involved create
quirements). See also Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, tit. VI, § 2640, 98
Stat. 1145 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (Supp. III 1985)).
141. Once a child receiving child support becomes a member of the AFDC assistance unit,
the state gains access to the child support because of the federal requirement that all such
payments be assigned to the state. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (1982); see supra note 17 for a
more detailed discussion of this requirement.
142. See Gilliard,633 F. Supp. at 1529. The Gilliardcourt rejected the government's argument that the F.U.D. rule caused no harm to the plaintiff's because it merely recognized and
reflected current family financial practices of pooling resources. Id. at 1557. The Supreme
Court recently relied on a similar argument and upheld a Food Stamp statute requiring certain
family members to file for benefits as a family unit. In Lyng v. Castillo, 106 S.Ct. 2727 (1986),
the Court observed that close relatives who share a home together, almost by definition, tend
to purchase and prepare meals together. Id. at 2728.
143. Gilliard,633 F. Supp. at 1532-33. The Gilliard court found that the F.U.D. statute is
a disincentive for absent parents to honor their duty to support their children. The evidence,
the court noted, showed that absent fathers rebelled against the system by withholding child
support that was no longer exclusively available for their children. Id. at 1559.
144. See, e.g., id. at 1540 (The Gilliard court observed that absent fathers' reaction to the
filing unit requirement have ranged from rebellion against the system by refusing to continue
to pay child support to withdrawing from their children's lives by no longer visiting.).
145. See supra note 95 for a listing of states enacting joint custody statutes.
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conflicting goals toward ensuring family stability. The AFDC program has
gradually transformed into myth the traditional notion that family law matters are the exclusive province of the states and not the federal government.
Yet, Congress has not addressed directly or adequately important family law
questions arising in the context of the AFDC legislative process. Finally, it
is critical that Congress focus on the conflict between state and federal social
welfare legislation that provides monetary benefits to families on the one
hand, and their deleterious impact upon traditional ideas of family life and
its goals on the other hand.
Diann Dawson*

* The author is an employee of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not
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